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T he emerging subfield of “securitydemographics” examines the linkagesbetween population dynamics and the
security trajectories of nation-states. For the last
5 to 10 years, researchers have examined the
security aspects of such topics as the demo-
graphic transition, the sub-replacement birth
rates of developed economies, the proportion of
young men as compared to older men in the
population, the effects of legal and illegal immi-
gration, and the effects of pandemics such as
AIDS and drug-resistant tuberculosis. We hope
to add the variable of gender balance to the dis-
cussion: are societies with an abnormal ratio
between men and women less secure?
Missing Women
In two areas of the world such imbalances have
become fairly significant in the last half-centu-
ry: 1) Russia and several former Warsaw Pact
nations, where we find a deficit of adult males;1
and 2) Asia—particularly India, China, and
Pakistan—where we find a deficit of women,
including female infants and children. We will
let other scholars research the link between a
deficit of males and national security. Our
research, as explained in Bare Branches: The
Security Implications of Asia’s Surplus Male
Population (MIT Press, 2004), focuses on the
deficit of females in Asia. Standard demograph-
ic analysis readily confirms this abnormal
deficit.2 If we compare overall population sex
ratios, the ratio for, say, Latin America is 98
males per 100 females (using 2000 U.S. Census
Bureau figures), but the corresponding figure
for Asia is 104.4 males per 100 females. But one
must also keep in mind the sheer size of Asia’s
population: India and China alone comprise
approximately 38 percent of the world’s popu-
lation. Thus, the overall sex ratio of the world is
101.3, despite the fact that the ratios for the rest
of the world (excluding Oceania) range from
93.1 (Europe) to 98.9 (Africa). 
Birth sex ratios in several Asian countries are
outside of the established norm of 105-107 boy
babies born for every 100 girl babies. The
Indian government’s estimate of its birth sex
ratio is approximately 113 boy babies born for
every 100 girl babies, with some locales record-
ing ratios of 156 and higher (India Registrar
General, 2001). The Chinese government states
that its birth sex ratio is approximately 119,
though some Chinese scholars have gone on
record that the birth sex ratio is at least 121
(China State Statistical Bureau, 2001).3 Again,
in some locations, the ratio is higher; for exam-
ple, the island of Hainan’s birth sex ratio is 135.
Other countries of concern include Pakistan,
Bangladesh, Nepal, Bhutan, Taiwan,
Afghanistan, and South Korea.4
Another indicator of gender imbalance is
early childhood mortality. Boys typically have a
higher early childhood mortality rate, which
virtually cancels out their numerical advantage
by age five. Boys’ higher mortality is tied to sex-
linked genetic mutations, such as hemophilia,
as well as higher death rates from common
childhood diseases, such as dysentery. However,
in some of the Asian nations mentioned above,
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early childhood mortality rates for girls are
actually higher than boys’ (United Nations
Population Division, 1998). Furthermore,
orphanages house more girls than boys in these
nations.5
What forces drive the deficit of females in
Asian nations such as India and China? Why
are their birth sex ratios so abnormal? Why are
early childhood mortality rates for girls higher
than those for boys? Why are most children in
orphanages girls? How do we account for the
disappearance of so many women—estimated
conservatively at over 90 million missing
women in seven Asian countries alone (see
Table 1)?
Some scholars assert that there may be a
physical cause at work preventing female births,
such as the disease hepatitis B, antigens of
which have been associated with higher birth
sex ratios (Oster, 2005). While this may well be
a contributing factor, it is worth considering the
experience of the municipality of Shenzhen in
southern China. Alarmed at the rising birth sex
ratio, which reached 118 in 2002, local officials
instituted a strict crackdown on black market
ultrasound clinics. Offering up to 2,000 yuan
for tips, officials then vigorously prosecuted and
imprisoned the owners and technicians. By
2004, the birth sex ratio had dropped to 108
(“Shenzhen’s newborn sex ratio more bal-
anced,” 2005).
Accounts such as this support the thesis that
the modern gender imbalance in Asia, as with
historical gender imbalances in Asia and else-
where, is largely a man-made phenomenon.6
Girls are being culled from the population,
whether through prenatal sex identification and
female sex-selective abortion, or through rela-
tive neglect compared to male offspring in early
childhood (including abandonment), or
through desperate life circumstances that might
lead to suicide. 
The gender imbalance in Asia is primarily
the result of son preference and the profound
devaluation of female life. This value ordering is
not confined to Asia; why, then, is the deficit of
women found there almost exclusively?
Historically, of course, the culling of girls was
not confined to Asia; evidence for this practice
can be found on every continent. And practices
are changing in some Asian nations: Japan nor-
malized its sex ratios in the 20th century, and in
South Korea, the deficit has been decreasing
over time (Dickemann, 1975; South Korea
National Statistics Office, 2001). 
But this excellent question can only be
answered through a multifactorial cultural
analysis that examines variables such as religious
prohibitions or sanctions; patrilocality (couples
living with the husband’s family); the duty of
male offspring to support aged parents; dowry,
hypergyny, and caste purity in India; the effect
of interventions such as China’s one-child poli-
cy; and the web of incentives and disincentives
surrounding the issue of prenatal sex determi-
nation technology.7
Bare Branches
What effect will this deficit of females have on
the security trajectory of nations?
Anthropologist Barbara D. Miller (2001) has
termed the preservation of a balanced sex ratio a
“public good” that governments overlook at
their peril. Will it matter to India and China
that by the year 2020, 12-15 percent of their
young adult males will not be able to “settle
down” because the girls that would have grown
up to be their wives were disposed of by their
societies instead? With each passing year
between now and 2020 (or even further), both
the proportion and the number of young adult
males that exceed the number of young adult
females in China and India will increase
(Hudson & den Boer, 2004). The Chinese have
a special term for such young men: guang gun-
er, or “bare branches”—branches of the family
tree that will never bear fruit, but which may be
useful as “bare sticks,” or clubs.
The Chinese elision between bare branches
and truncheons echoes our argument: men who
are not provided the opportunity to develop a
vested interest in a system of law and order will
gravitate toward a system based on physical
force, in which they hold an advantage over
other members of society. Furthermore, in a
Will it matter to
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system with too few women, the men who
marry are those with higher socio-economic
status. The men unable to marry are poorer, less
educated, less skilled, and less likely to be
employed. These men are already at risk for
establishing a system based on physical force in
order to obtain by force what they cannot
obtain legitimately. Without the opportunity to
establish a household, they may not transition
from potential threats to potential protectors of
society. The rate of criminal behavior of unmar-
ried men is many times higher than that of mar-
ried men; marriage is a reliable predictor of a
downturn in reckless, antisocial, illegal, and
violent behavior by young adult males (Mazur
& Michalek, 1998). If this transition cannot be
effected for a sizeable proportion of a society’s
young men, the society is likely to become less
stable.8
Statistical evidence for the linkage between
gender imbalance and conflict includes several
excellent studies that have demonstrated a
strong correlation between state-level sex ratios
and state-level rates of violent crime in India
(Oldenburg, 1992; Dreze & Khera, 2000).
States with high sex ratios, such as Uttar
Pradesh, have much higher violent crime rates
than states with more normal sex ratios, such as
Kerala. Historical case studies abound, since
abnormal sex ratios are not a new phenomena.
The 19th century Nien rebels came from a very
poor region in China with a sex ratio of at least
129 men per 100 women. At first, relatively
smaller groups of men coalesced to form smug-
gling and extortion gangs. Eventually, these
gangs banded together to form larger armies,
wresting territory from imperial control. It took
the emperor years to subdue this rebellion. 
We must not overlook sociological theory
and experimental evidence, as well. For exam-
ple, scholars have studied the behavior of unat-
tached young males, noting their propensity to
congregate with others like them and to engage
in dominance displays in such groups.
Sociologists have found that the “risky shift” in
group behavior, where a group is willing to take
greater risks and engage in more reckless behav-
ior than an individual member of the group, is
much more pronounced in groups comprised
solely of unattached young adult males
(Johnson, Stemler, & Hunter, 1977).
After examining the evidence, some predic-
tions can be made for societies with rising sex
ratios: crime rates will increase; the proportion
of violent crime will increase; rates of drug use,
drug smuggling, weapons smuggling, traffick-
ing, and prostitution will increase (see Hudson
& den Boer, 2004). The society might develop
domestic and international chattel markets that
kidnap and traffic women within the country
and across borders. For example, the shortage of
marriage-age women in China is fueling a brisk
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Statistics, Population Census, 2001:
Preliminary Report, http://www.
bbsgov.org; China—National Bureau of
Statistics of the People’s Republic of
China, “Communiqué on Major Figures
of the 2000 Population Census,” No. 1,
April 23, 2002, http://www.stats.gov.cn/
english/newrelease/statistical
reports/200204230084.htm; India—
Office of the Registrar General, Census
of India, 2001, Series 1: India, Paper 1 of
2001: Provisional Population Totals (New
Delhi: India, 2001), http://www.
censusindia.net/results; Pakistan—
Population Census Organization,
Statistics Division, Government of
Pakistan, “1998 Census of Pakistan,”
http://www.pap.org.pk/
population/sec2.htm; South Korea—
National Statistical Office, Republic of
Korea Census Population, 2000,
http://www.nso.go.kr; and Taiwan—
Statistical Bureau of Taiwan, Historical
Comparison of the Census Results, 2000,
http://www.stat.gov.tw
Note: From Bare Branches: The Security
Implications of Asia’s Surplus Male
Population (page 62), by Valerie M.
Hudson and Andrea M. den Boer, 2004,
Cambridge, MA: MIT Press. Copyright
2004 by Belfer Center for Science and
International Affairs. Reprinted with
permission.
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business in trafficked brides from North Korea
(Demick, 2003).
We must also examine the reaction of the
government. Historically, we have found that as
governments become aware of the negative con-
sequences of a growing number of bare branch-
es, most governments are motivated to do
something. In the past, “doing something”
meant thinning the numbers of bare branches,
whether through fighting, sponsoring the con-
struction of large public works necessitating
dangerous manual labor, exporting them to less
populated areas, or co-opting them into the
military or police. One 16th century
Portuguese monarch sent his army, composed
primarily of noble and non-noble bare branch-
es, on one of the later crusades to avoid a crisis
of governance; more than 25 percent of that
army never returned, and many others were
seriously wounded (Boone, 1983, 1986). 
We find that the need to control the rising
instability created by the increasing numbers of
bare branches has led governments to favor
more authoritarian approaches to internal gov-
ernance and less benign international presences.
In many ways, a society’s prospects for democ-
racy and peace are diminished in step with the
devaluation of daughters.
How will this play out in 21st century Asia?
Gender imbalance does not cause war or con-
flict per se, but it can aggravate it. Will the
internal instability caused by substantial num-
bers of bare branches (by 2020, 28 million in
India—the same or more in China) overshadow
external security concerns for the governments
of these nations? Some potentially unstable sit-
uations spring to mind: the feuding countries of
Pakistan and India have gender imbalances, as
do China and Taiwan; and the resource-rich
Russian Far East faces an influx of Chinese
workers while Russia continues to lose men
(Radyuhin, 2003).
How will gender imbalances affect the
potential for democracy in China and the evo-
lution of democracy in India? The gender
imbalances of these two countries will not
remain solely their problem, as alone they com-
prise more than one-third of the world’s popu-
lation. The status of women in these nations
could become an important factor in both
domestic and international security in Asia,
with possible implications for the entire inter-
national system.
The Chinese government is acting on this
linkage. In July 2004, they announced their
desire to normalize the birth sex ratio by the
year 2010, and in January 2005, they
announced programs to provide old-age pen-
sions to parents of girls. Only time will tell if
these and other interventions will achieve their
desired ends. In the meantime, the horse has
left the barn for at least the next 20 years, for
there is no way to undo the birth sex ratios of
previous years. Have these Asian nations discov-
ered the value of female life too late? The whole
world is waiting to see whether bare branches
will be given the opportunity to grow again.
Notes
1. In Russia and its former satellites, drug and alcohol
abuse, as well as tuberculosis and AIDS, have dramatical-
ly increased the mortality rate for adult males—recent
U.S. Census Bureau (2005) figures estimate that there
are 10 million fewer men than women in Russia alone.
This, in turn, has fueled female emigration, supporting
not only to a vigorous “mail-order bride” business, but
also increasingly sophisticated and far-flung transnational
prostitution and human trafficking networks.
2. There are established ranges of normal variation in
overall population sex ratios, as well as early childhood
and birth sex ratios. These ratios are adjusted for coun-
try-specific circumstances such as, for example, maternal
mortality rates and infant mortality rates. Using official
census data, we can determine if there are fewer women
than could reasonably be expected. Of course, there are
perturbing variables: for example, many of the Gulf
states have very abnormal sex ratios favoring males due
to the high number of guest workers, predominantly
male, that labor in the oil economies of these states.
Once we take these types of factors into account, we
find that the deficit of females in Asia is a real phenome-
non (Hudson & den Boer, 2004).
3. Additional information provided by the director
of the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences via e-mail,
concerning the Nando Times article, “China
Reportedly Has 20 Percent More Males Than
Females,” dated January 7, 1999.
4. No data are available for North Korea.
5. Other statistics also factor into the observed gen-
der imbalance. In the West, for example, male suicides
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far outnumber female suicides. But in countries with
deficits of women, female suicides outnumber male
suicides. In fact, approximately 55 percent of all female
suicides in the world are Chinese women of childbear-
ing age (Murray & Lopez, 1996).
6. For more examples, please see Hudson and den
Boer (2004).
7. For a more complete cultural analysis of these
practices in Asia, please see Hudson and den Boer
(2004), Bossen (2000), Miller (2001), and Sen (1990). 
8. Note that this transition is also less likely in soci-
eties with a deficit of males; in such societies, men
need not marry or form permanent attachments to
obtain food, shelter, sexual services, domestic services,
and so forth. In that respect, societies with too few
men and societies with too many men share some
characteristics. Furthermore, societies in which mar-
riage age is generally delayed for men can also produce
instability; for example, the average age at first mar-
riage for men in Egypt is now 32 (Diane Singerman,
personal communication, July 19, 2004).
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